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Abstract 
Enterprises, both public and private, have rapidly commenced using the benefits of enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) combined with business analytics and “open data sets” which are 
often outside the control of the enterprise to gain further efficiencies, build new service 
operations and increase business activity. In many cases, these business activities are based 
around relevant software systems hosted in a “cloud computing” environment. “Garbage in, 
garbage out”, or “GIGO”, is a term long used to describe problems in unqualified dependency 
on information systems, dating from the 1960s. However, a more pertinent variation arose 
sometime later, namely “garbage in, gospel out” signifying that with large scale information 
systems, such as ERP and usage of open datasets in a cloud environment, the ability to verify 
the authenticity of those data sets used may be almost impossible, resulting in dependence 
upon questionable results. Illicit data set “impersonation” becomes a reality. At the same time 
the ability to audit such results may be an important requirement, particularly in the public 
sector. This paper discusses the need for enhancement of identity, reliability, authenticity and 
audit services, including naming and addressing services, in this emerging environment and 
analyses some current technologies that are offered and which may be appropriate. However, 
severe limitations to addressing these requirements have been identified and the paper 
proposes further research work in the area. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION - CRITICAL RESOURCES AND DEPENDENCE 
 “Garbage in, garbage out” (Wikipedia 2013), or “GIGO” is a term used to describe 
problems in dependency on information systems dating from the 1960s. However, a more 
pertinent variation arose sometime later, namely “garbage in, gospel out” signifying that with 
large scale information systems the ability to verify data sets used, simply by their content, 
may be almost impossible, resulting in dependence upon untrusted data sets and even the 
provenance of unknown software processing elements. So-called “big data” structures 
exemplify this situation where such activities as ERP and data analytics are employed. 
Essentially this means that trust must be placed in the naming and addressing structures 
employed in any large scale information system to access and depend upon the veracity of 
entities chosen, particularly in a “cloud computing” environment. Even in the physical world, 
for example in cities, as the size and complexity of the situation rapidly expanded the need for 
a scheme of names and addresses, with appropriate directions in the use of that data, became 
essential. In information systems this translates into the need for a highly dependable and 
resilient name/address scheme for the elements involved in the overall system, including the 
actual computers and interconnecting data networks used as well as the data sets/files and 
processes involved. Moreover, in a fashion reminiscent of a fast changing city, these schemes 
must now cope with very large scale structures with high complexity and rapid change 
parameters as well as existence in diverse regulatory and enterprise requirements. At the same 
time, there may also exist audit and forensic requirements, including retention of transaction 
details, associated metadata, etc. necessitating the retention of the “traversal” undertaken by 
an application on behalf of a user. Moreover, that “user” may no longer be a human person 
but rather a “thing” as the “Internet-of-Things” gains global momentum and objects of all 
types become interconnected and co-dependent. Such systems are being created around a 
combination of the Internet’s data network protocol set with its associated hardware and 
software artifacts and “virtual machine (VM)” technology in the associated computers, these 
then coupled with “World Wide Web (WWW)” based information handling processes. 
The problem relating to current usage of cloud computing environments is summarised 
by Celesti et al (2010) as follows. 
In cloud computing environments, as well as in all systems characterized by a 
high level of dynamism, naming and resource location become critical issues. 
Until now, the Internet has used the Domain Name System (DNS) for the 
resolution of domain names, that does not seem to be suitable to the new emerging 
cloud scenarios. 
However, equally critical is any resource identification and addressing scheme used within an 
actual computer or virtual machine existing in that cloud which, in turn, must be mapped to 
from another system anywhere on the Internet. Celesti et al (2010) also state that in this 
environment “…the need of an effective cloud naming system should be characterized by: 
scalability, extensibility, services of description and discovery, name recycling, 
non-correlation, and name space integration mechanisms which avoid name conflicts.”  
However, they do not mention the critical importance of the fact that any new scheme must be 
absolutely trustworthy and resilient with associated needs for reliable collection of audit and 
forensic data, including all necessary metadata.   
II.  OTHIS AND ITS “REALMS”/REGIONS 
The “Open and Trusted Health Information Systems (OTHIS)” project at the Queensland 
University of Technology clearly identified distinct “realms” vital to the identification and 
authentication of elements within an e-health system. Moreover, in such “realms”, 
complementary naming and addressing schemes may be needed with the ability of these 
schemes to “mesh” together as required for a resource to be clearly and unambiguously 
identified, authenticated and accessed. These realms were identified (Liu 2011; Liu et al. 2007; 
Liu et al. 2009) as being: 
• Health Informatics Access Control (HIAC),  
• Health Informatics Application Security (HIAS), and 
• Health Informatics Network Security (HINS). 
The aim of the OTHIS project (Liu 2011; Liu et al. 2007; Liu et al. 2009) was: 
... to address privacy and security requirements at each level within a modern HIS 
architecture to ensure the protection of data from both internal and external 
threats. OTHIS has the capacity to ensure legal compliance of any HIS to 
appropriate legislative and regulatory requirements. 
It was, however, quickly recognised that naming, addressing and authentication of data and 
software processes had clear roles to play in any overall security design and assessment.  
The above realms may thus be more generalized into the broader aspects of information 
systems security as being related to “access control” including authentication and 
authorization (at the computer system level), application security (at the database and 
software process levels) and network security (at the data interconnection level).  For 
example, it was identified by Henrickson et al (2007) and Croll et al (2007) that naming and 
resource location/authentication and access control in connected computer systems presented 
radically different approaches when “Discretionary Access Control (DAC)” were compared to 
“Mandatory Access Control (MAC)” structures provided by an operating system  
(Department of Defense 1985). 
Naming, addressing and authentication of the entities in each of these realms have 
become critical security concerns, including the security of the systems that actually perform 
these naming, addressing and authentication processes. In a public cloud environment the 
situation regarding this latter concern takes on a new dimension in that the processes involved 
may themselves be virtualised and distributed onto systems on a global basis. 
III. NAMING AND ADDRESSING IN AN AGE OF “CLOUD COMPUTING 
The cloud computing environment is today built upon earlier naming and addressing 
schemes with associated and differing levels of assurance. However, a number of suggestions 
for an extension of earlier schemes to address the cloud environment, largely based around 
extending the basic concepts of the usual “Uniform Resource Locator (URL)” associated with 
the World-Wide –Web, have been proposed (Davis et al. ; Dong et al. 2006). 
An analysis of earlier attempts at reliable and manageable naming and addressing 
schemes along with currently used schemes is worthwhile. These include: 
• the X.500 directory scheme for the “Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)” model 
proposed by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), coupled with 
the actual OSI model itself and its security standard (International Standard IS 
7498-2); 
• proprietary systems used for allied services in such network products as IBM’s 
“System Network Architecture (SNA)”, “Digital Equipment Corporation 
Network (DECNET), Novell Network scheme, NetBIOS from Microsoft, etc.; 
• the “World-Wide-Web (WWW)” Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and allied 
URI/URN scheme; 
• earlier “Data Dictionary (DD)” concepts and systems; 
• current “Application Programming Interface (API)” structures for “Open Data” 
integration and, 
• the current Internet “Domain Name System (DNS)” and its “Domain Name 
System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)”. 
However, dependence still exists on the Internet’s “Domain Name Service (DNS)” from 
November 1983, 30 years ago, and the same year that the newer Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol set replaced the earlier Network Control 
Program (NCP) protocol. At the time, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
(ARPANET) which separated from the USA military network consisted of some 68 nodes but 
the idea that rapid expansion was coming was widely accepted. 
The scheme for Internet, then ARPANET, based naming and addressing grew out of the 
problem of maintaining and distributing a centralized file of such data (hosts.txt) as the then 
ARPANET developed. The relevant RFC stated as follows (Mockapetris 1983): 
As applications grow to span multiple hosts, then networks, and finally internets, 
these applications must also span multiple administrative boundaries and related 
methods of operation (protocols, data formats, etc).  The number of resources 
(for example mailboxes), the number of locations for resources, and the diversity 
of such an environment cause formidable problems when we wish to create 
consistent methods for referencing particular resources that are similar but 
scattered throughout the environment. 
That Internet standard, replaced with later standards, still clearly stated the problem as 
being one of there being a basic need for a “consistent name space which will be used for 
referring to resources.  In order to avoid the problems caused by ad hoc encodings, names 
should not contain addresses, routes, or similar information as part of the name.”  However, 
this and its related standards did not address the critical problem of security and resilience of 
the actual naming and addressing system as it took a central role in the global Internet. 
Moreover, they also proposed a strict hierarchical naming form with an associated 
hierarchical name to address resolution structure.  Indeed RFC 882 (Mockapetris 1983) 
clearly stated that the overall plan was for a scheme whereby “the domain name space is a tree 
structure.”  It was not until some 14 years later that the problem of overall security of the 
DNS was considered in the “Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)” RFC set. 
Moreover, the basic DNSSEC RFC stated clearly as follows (Eastlake et al. 1997): 
The Domain Name System (DNS) has become a critical operational part of the 
Internet infrastructure yet it has no strong security mechanisms to assure data 
integrity or authentication. 
Even today the use of DNSSEC technology and artifacts is very limited and almost 
non-existent in the private sector globally.  This is significant as large scale access to 
globally stored datasets and software processes becomes the norm and these collections are 
integrated into enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems which encompass all aspects of an 
enterprise’s activities, public or private. In this situation, private enterprise data sets may be 
combined with other, often “open”, data sets from public or government sources, such as for 
planning market development activity, etc. the research question is one of whether or not the 
DNSSEC architecture can be expanded to meet the new requirements for assured 
identification, addressing and authentication in a cloud computing environment. One 
extension of DNSSEC, the “DANE” proposal, from the “DNS-based Authentication of 
Named Entities (DANE)” working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), sets 
out a proposition to answer an authentication need for the Internet as follows (Barnes 2012). 
Authentication of domain names is a fundamental function for Internet security. In 
order for applications to protect information from unauthorized disclosure, they 
need to make sure that the entity on the far end of a secure connection actually 
represents the domain that the user intended to connect to. 
DANE proposes a new “chain of trust” that may be employed to increase confidence in 
data and programs used in a global Internet environment. It does not, however, extend below 
the “network realm”, as identified in OTHIS, to the authentication of the individual assets that 
an ERP or data analytics system may need. 
At the same time the concept of “Unified Communications (UC)” has come to the fore, 
particularly for medium to large scale enterprises. As the global telecommunications rapidly 
changes from the “public switched telephone network (PSTN)” to “packet switching” 
technologies and systems and enterprises, both public and private incorporate total 
information services into a single, Internet protocol based facility, with such technologies as 
“voice-over-internet protocol (VoIP)” etc., the naming and addressing structures come under 
major pressure. This even further accentuated as the enterprises employ cloud computing 
structures incorporating both “virtual machine (VM)” and “virtual network (VN)” 
technologies. For example, the corporate “private branch exchange (PBX)”, offering 
traditional voice/switched circuit services is being replaced by these UC services. Bradley and 
Shah (2010) outline no less than 11 major threats to the security of the UC environment, many 
of which involve trust in the naming and addressing scheme in use once the security of the 
earlier switched circuit system is removed. The International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) “ENUM” (E.164) standard addresses this problem as indicated in a “Wikipedia” entry 
as follows. 
Telephone number mapping is a system of unifying the international telephone 
number system of the public switched telephone network with the Internet 
addressing and identification name spaces. Internationally, telephone numbers 
are systematically organized by the E.164 standard, while the Internet uses the 
Domain Name System (DNS) for linking domain names to IP addresses and other 
resource information. Telephone number mapping systems provide facilities to 
determine applicable Internet communications servers responsible for servicing a 
given telephone number using DNS queries. The most prominent facility for 
telephone number mapping is the E.164 Number Mapping (ENUM) standard. It 
uses special DNS record types to translate a telephone number into a Uniform 
Resource Identifier (URI) or IP address that can be used in Internet 
communications. 
Van der Berg (2010) also refers to this accelerating change and the need for nations to 
carefully examine the transition. The security question related to the associated “ENUM” 
registry for a nation also has to be closely examined and so far there appears little major 
research into this problem. Moreover, adoption of the ENUM standard has to occur and so far 
it appears that few nations have moved in this direction. A database held by the RIPE ENUM 
group (Réseaux IP Européens) details the problems in adoption of this standard in practical 
reality. For example, this report claims that for Australia any ENUM project is “in hiatus”, viz. 
not progressing as “ ... due to the current lack of interest in ENUM, a commercial 
implementation should not be established at this time.”  For Taiwan, this report claims that 
“although the User-ENUM domain for country code 886 has been delegated, no information 
for enumdata.org has yet been provided by the delegatee.” However, in reality the adoption of 
VoIP and allied video services has rapidly progressed at the enterprise level, i.e. replacing the 
functions of the earlier “Private Branch Exchange (PBX)” on the enterprise side. There are 
thus rapidly emerging challenges, including technical, policy, political and legal factors, that 
need to be addressed urgently in addition to the pressing problem of the overall security of 
any ENUM based national telecommunications structure development. 
IV. ERP, ANALYTICS AND “BIG/OPEN DATA” – CORRECT RESOURCES? 
The above considerations, of course, apply to the “network realm” as identified in the 
OTHIS project and normally do not address naming and addressing inside a host, or even a 
client, computer system. In this latter case naming and addressing solutions depend upon the 
level of granularity to be catered for. At a higher level, an appropriate file system holding both 
data and program entities, takes on this responsibility with protection of the “file structure” 
left to access control enforced by the operating system. At a next level, e.g. the “database” 
level, such structures as a “database schema” may identify the elements composing a database 
and their relationships.  These entities may then be accessed by a name using, for example, a 
“query language” such as SQL or by direct named reference from an application program. 
In an enterprise environment employing ERP technologies the situation in regard to 
reliable naming and addressing is rapidly becoming more complex. At one level, an enterprise 
individual ERP level, individual data sets employed for ERP processes may be, and usually 
are, enterprise specific and protected under appropriate entity rule sets. However, ERP today 
may make use of other datasets to develop appropriate business plans and processes, e.g. 
national demographic data sets from governmental entities may be incorporated into analysis 
of existing enterprise market or sales data for development of better business planning, human 
resource/personnel planning may draw upon open social networks such as “LinkedIN” as well 
as “in-house” data to enhance appropriate analysis of employment requirements, and so on.  
In turn, large scale or “big data” may be the subject of analytics to further provide background 
data foe ERP activity. 
The concept of a “data dictionary” was a common theme for many years as database 
technology gained widespread acceptance from the 1970s. It was defined as follows by IBM 
in 1993 (IBM Corporation 1993): 
data dictionary n.  
A centralized repository of information about data such as meaning, relationships 
to other data, origin, usage, and format. It assists management, database 
administrators, system analysts, and application programmers in planning, 
controlling, and evaluating the collection, storage, and use of data. 
Essentially a “data dictionary (DD)” contains all the necessary metadata needed to 
answer access requests without any security requirements involved. As discussed later, the 
data dictionary concept may be a candidate for the technology needed to provide the 
assurance needed for data and process entity access authentication in a cloud environment. 
However, this concept places a greater need for security on the data dictionary itself, in line 
with earlier concepts of a separate and verified access control sub-system as a part of any 
basic operating system design. 
All of these processes make assumptions about the correctness of data used. In particular, 
where external data sets are used and relied upon the need to trust the provenance of those 
data sets is a paramount concern.  This concern now extends to what in the past may have 
been files or data sets that were under strict control of the enterprise itself though the support 
and maintenance of them on in-house computer and data network systems. However, with 
ERP related data moving to both private and public cloud systems environments those earlier 
sureties have disappeared and trust must now be placed in the security of any cloud systems 
and its provider/operator. 
V. THE “OPEN DATA” MOVEMENT – INTEGRATION INTO ERP / 
ANALYTICS – AUDIT AND FORENSICS NEEDS 
Further candidates for the enhancement of security for naming, addressing and 
authentication services in an emerging cloud computing environment may involve use of the 
technologies being employed in the “open data” movement. Essentially, the “open data” 
movement sets out to make available the “raw” data held, but often closed, by public sector 
and other enterprises. Governments worldwide have started to embrace this ideal. For 
example (see Figure 1), the State of Queensland, Australia, has now placed some 499 datasets 
onto an open server to encourage development of new software and services using that data 
(Queensland Government 2013) while the UK has placed 10,333 such datasets, as at October 
2013, into its open data website.  
 
Figure 1. Websites for dataset provisioning. 
Further, the “open data” concept has been explained in a Wikipedia entry as “the idea 
that certain data should be freely available to everyone to use and republish as they wish, 
without restrictions from copyright, patents or other mechanisms of control. The goals of the 
open data movement are similar to those of other "Open" movements such as open source, 
open hardware, open content, and open access. The philosophy behind open data has been 
long established (for example in the Mertonian tradition of science), but the term "open data" 
itself is recent, gaining popularity with the rise of the Internet and World Wide Web and, 
especially, with the launch of open-data government initiatives such as Data.gov and 
Data.gov.uk.”  A particular aspect of the “open data” concept is that anyone may use offered 
datasets for any purpose free from onerous overriding restrictions but with some conditions 
that the provenance of the data is acknowledged and any passing on of the data via, say, an 
application is likewise unrestricted.  This is again emphasized by the appropriate definition 
given by the “Open Knowledge Foundation” (URL http://okfn.org/opendata/ ) which states 
that “Open data is data that can be freely used, reused and redistributed by anyone – subject 
only, at most, to the requirement to attribute and sharealike.” The movement should be 
compared to, and be seen as an outgrowth of, similar activities such as the “open source” 
movement covering availability of software systems. The major problem to be solved is 
standardization of associated metadata structures that enable the ready use of any available 
data for whatever purpose. The research challenge is one of also involving appropriate 
integrity and authenticity checks into such metadata structures.  Moreover, the necessity for 
such security enhancement of the total open data concept needs to be embraced by associated 
policy and legal entities.  
The State of Queensland has, moreover, offered prizes for applications that 
“...demonstrate the most innovative use of and real outcomes from public data.”  Similarly, 
in Taiwan, similar efforts to promote the “open data” cause have recently occurred through 
the formation of an alliance which was established in September 2013 following the earlier 
adoption of the open data cause by the Government of Taiwan. It is vital in this situation that 
the veracity of any dataset used can be tested prior to any major application development 
occurring. It must be acknowledged that trust will be placed in the output from such 
applications given that such data may be readily and legally “re-published”.  This often 
occurs under an appropriate arrangement such as through the “Creative Commons” concept.  
In the case of Queensland, the “CKAN” facility is used to enable access to datasets and 
elements. The CKAN facility, from the “Open Knowledge Foundation” is described as 
follows (Open Knowledge Foundation). 
CKAN is a powerful data management system that makes data accessible – by 
providing tools to streamline publishing, sharing, finding and using data. CKAN 
is aimed at data publishers (national and regional governments, companies and 
organizations) wanting to make their data open and available. 
It offers a range of facilities including an “Application Programming Interface (API)” for use 
by software developers but does not, at present, offer verification and allied security services. 
However, a number of alternatives and complimentary services and sub-systems exist, 
such as the “Representational State Transfer (REST)” scheme which has been defined as 
follows (Rodriguez 2008). 
REST defines a set of architectural principles by which you can design Web 
services that focus on a system's resources, including how resource states are 
addressed and transferred over HTTP by a wide range of clients written in 
different languages. If measured by the number of Web services that use it, REST 
has emerged in the last few years alone as a predominant Web service design 
model. 
Once again, however, REST does not attempt to answer any underlying security concerns and, 
in fact, leaves these to the web servers involved via response to html requests. 
Research is urgently needed into the security services offered, or not offered, by these 
emerging “open data” service systems. A key question is one of whether or not they can be 
extended to meet the authentication and resilience needs of a global naming and addressing 
system operating in a cloud computing environment. 
At the same time, dependence on ERP results dictates that appropriate audit records are 
maintained in case of dispute or to further enhance opportunities. These audit records may 
also be required in legal “discovery” in the case of any litigation or investigation. Data, 
transactions and metadata may all be elements that need to be recorded in audit records even 
where the pertinent record is created from both internal and external resources. At present 
there appears to be little to no consideration of these requirements in the technologies and 
sub-systems being developed or used. Legislative requirements may even exist that require 
such records to be created and stored for later analysis. The research problem here is one of 
defining mechanisms for the identification and description of such requirements in such a way 
as to be able to include them in any data dictionary like structure used to provide a solution to 
the need.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS: RESEARCH DIRECTIONS IN TRUST FOR NAMING, 
ADDRESSING AND AUTHENTICATION IN THE “CLOUD” FOR 
ERP/ANALYTICS/OPEN-BIG DATA 
Research directions in the area of large scale systems for ERP and analytics in support of 
enterprise development must commence to address the urgent need for new structures in 
reliable, scalable and secure naming and addressing schemes for entities in a global Internet. 
Moreover, the computational and data storage elements of that global information 
infrastructure will be based, in many cases, around various forms of “cloud computing” 
structures particularly for large private and public enterprises.  The “open data” movement 
has commenced and access to large dataset collections will compliment usage of internal 
datasets contained in any ERP facility. At the same time, the need for efficient and reliable 
audit record creation and collection has accelerated with growing requirements being set out 
in legislative instruments at national and regional levels aimed at assisting in forensic 
accounting procedures. 
A number of immediate research directions can be readily identified. These include: 
• Provisioning of necessary and verifiable authentication and integrity controls in 
the metadata structures proposed for open data sets, potentially based on current 
markup-language schemes and any potential interaction with associated metadata 
schemes in use for proprietary ERP facilities; 
• Incorporation of the DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security) architecture into 
access verification processes for both open data sets and closed ERP databases 
when application systems are involved; 
• Implications of the movement to IPv6 structures, with associated IPSec facilities, 
in relation to access to both ERP related and open datasets; 
• Development of the concept of mandatorily enforced “profiles” in relation to 
access control parameters for ERP and open data systems;  
• Clear identification of “realms” or sub-structures that can be independently 
managed and secured while maintaining an overall security posture, involving 
possible examination of the earlier “Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)” model 
security architecture espoused in international standard IS 7498-2; 
• Definition of a security meta-structure that allow for security parameters that 
radically differ, e.g. from ERP related data to open data sets, that allows for 
disparate open data interfaces (APIs) to be used.  
This paper has considered some candidate technologies for this task but much more 
research, design, development and experimentation is essential. Essentially, researchers need 
to define and build small demonstrator systems that may be used to clarify design and 
implementation parameters as well as the usual performance and trustworthiness factors. In 
particular, any solution set must be implementable using current development and testing 
systems, usually based around the World-Wide-Web paradigm and an environment where 
end-user systems may be widely varied and of unknown security status. This is, of course, 
exacerbated by the “Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD)” phenomenon particular when 
considering use of analytics techniques on “Big Data” and enterprise ERP systems for the 
presentation of potentially important and confidential results to enterprise personnel in both 
the public and private sectors.  
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